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NOTES
GHOSTS OF THE HOLOCAUST:
HOLOCAUST VICTIM FINE ARTS
LITIGATION AND A STATUTORY
APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY
RULEt
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are the director of a prestigious public museum
of art in a major American metropolitan area. Seven years ago, an
elderly couple donated an extremely valuable piece by a well-known,
early-twentieth century artist to the museum. Prior to the donation,
the couple had owned the piece since the early 1950s and had been
told by the seller that the artist himself owned the piece prior to the
couple's purchase. Then, after several years of quiet enjoyment by
the museum and the museum-going public, the elderly heirs of the
alleged "rightful" owner serve the museum with a demand for the
painting's return. The heirs claim that the piece was looted during the
Second World War nearly 60 years ago when the owner fled Europe
to evade certain death under Nazi occupation.' What is a museum
director to do? Public opinion is clearly on the side of the previous
owners, yet the piece's title is not clear.., and it has been nearly 60
years. If the heirs were to triumph in this case, where would it end?2
t Awarded the fourth annual Case Western Reserve Law Review Outstanding Student
Note Award, as selected by the Volume 49 Editorial Board.
1 See Regina Hackett, SAM Sues Gallery in Dispute Over Matisse Work, SEATTLE POST-
INTEULLIGENCER, Aug. 26, 1998, at El (reporting essentially these facts regarding an heir's claim
to an extremely valuable Matisse painting currently held by the Seattle Art Museum).
2 See When it's too late to hand back the loot, EVENING STANDARD (London), Aug. 24,
1998, at 45, available in 1998 WL 18171204. As this article explains, museum curators are
faced with a quandary when dealing with stolen art:
Suppose a Renoir or Monet stolen by Nazi troops from [a] Jewish family in France
presents itself for sale, but the vendor innocently paid £5 million for it in New York?
Do you refuse it, even though the French Jews no longer have title in French law?
Do you refuse, for example, Imperial Chinese art looted by British troops from the
Summer Palace in Peking in 1860? Or Benin bronzes saved by the British from dis-
aster in the 1870s? Or sculpture looted by who knows who from Cambodian tem-
ples in 1970? Or old masters removed by Napoleon's army in Italy and Russia quite
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While the fine art trade is one of the largest and most lucrative
international industries, the present state of the law regarding stolen
art is anything but clear.3 The problem raised by fine art trafficking,
both legal and illegal, is exacerbated by both the volume of the trade
itself and the inconsistency and confusion with which courts, already
unfamiliar with the subject of fine art title law, have approached the
problem. In addition, the years 1994 and 1997 saw the publication of
two books4 that further disrupted the market for European Masters5
and pre-1940 modem art.6 These two best-selling books re-told the
story of Nazi fine art looting and revealed extensive archival research
which put the provenance 7 of more than 20,000 pieces of art, many
held by prominent American, Canadian, British, and French museums
and most purchased in good faith, up for debate.8 While to date no
claim has gone to trial, the mere potential for claims disrupts the art
market by putting the titles of thousands of pieces of often extremely
valuable art at risk (thereby making them worthless on the open mar-
ket). This uncertainty of title therefore threatens to force these treas-
ures underground (thereby effectively losing these pieces for world
enjoyment a second time). By forcing these pieces out of public con-
sumption-and surely limiting their private consumption-this risk
illegally on the marches of 1806 and 1812? Or Lord Cholmondeley's £9 million
Oudry, The White Duck, stolen in 1992 but now perhaps the bona fide legal prop-
erty of a Japanese or Italian?
Id.
3 See Emily C. Ehl, Comment, The Settlement of Greece v. Ward: Who Loses, 78 B.U. L.
REv. 661, 672 (1998) (arguing that there is little consensus among the few states that have ad-
dressed the issue of stolen art and no clear indications that other states would adopt any existing
rule over one of their own design).
4 See HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MuSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE
WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (1997); LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE
FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994).
5 The term "European Masters" is used to refer generally to European art dating from the
Renaissance to about 1850 (Proto-Renaissance, High Renaissance, Mannerist, Baroque, Rococo,
Realist and Neoclassicist periods, including miscellaneous sub genres). See HORST DE LA CROIX
Er AL., GARDNER'S ART THROUGH THE AGES pt. IV (9th ed. 1991).
6 Because of the peculiar racial, cultural and aesthetic interests of Hitler and the Nazi
high command, European art dating from 1500 to about 1830 and European art resulting from
modem movements such as Impressionism, Expressionism, Dadaism, Cubism, and Futurism
(1860s to 1930s) are particularly at risk of contemporary title disputes between good faith pur-
chasers and victims of the Nazi war machine.
7 Provenance is defined as:
[A] chronological history of a work of art traced to the creator by tracking the chain
of transfer of ownership and possession, location, publication, reproduction, and
display .... Provenance can impart information about, inter alia, authenticity and
ownership but no uniform guidelines exist to determine it, to document it, or to dis-
close it.
JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT & ARCHITECTURE LAW § 2.12[2] (3d ed. 1999).
8 Other experts have estimated that the number is actually closer to 100,000. See, e.g.,
John Harlow, Museums Fight to Keep Hitler Art Treasures, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 30,
1998, at 3G.
[Vol. 50:87
HOLOCAUST VICTIM FINE ARTS LITIGATION
undercuts much of both the public and private utility of the pieces
themselves.9 This uncertainty is further magnified when an art pos-
sessor's only hope of finally quieting the title of a piece lies in an ad
hoc ruling by a court unfamiliar with the subject or a coercive settle-
ment with a sympathy-engendering original owner. The legal prob-
lem presented is therefore twofold. First, most courts-actually, most
states-have yet to address this issue and therefore have no clear rule
to impose.1° Second, whatever rule is actually imposed is likely to be
done on an ad hoc basis, during the drama of a trial which will likely
be necessary to create (or defend) a marketable title. This Note will
address both of these issues in turn.
While the present state of law regarding stolen and resold art is
unclear, it is not without several distinct doctrines. The general rule
is that a thief cannot transfer legal or marketable title. While this
maxim normally holds true, it does have several notable exceptions."
9 See infra Part IV.C-D (arguing that some statute of limitations is necessary in order to
internalize the cost of ownership); see generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Legal Disputes Over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles, in
ECONOMICS OF THE ARTS: SELECrED ESSAYS 177 (Victor A. Ginsburgh and Pierre-Michel
Menger eds. 1996) (discussing the intermingling of art's peculiar public and private utility).
10 While other states have heard World War 1I art cases, these cases were heard in federal
court and all eventually settled without adjudication; only New York has had some experience
with the issues presented by these cases and stolen art in general. See, e.g., DeWeerth v. Bald-
inger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying New York law) (finding in favor of the
original owner of a Monet that had been looted by American G.Ls who had been stationed in her
sister's castle), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (reversing after finding that the statute of
limitations had run under New York law); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F.
Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying New York law, finding for the plaintiff and against the
American collector who had purchased pieces from an American soldier shortly after the War),
affd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Served on the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss the Grand Jury subpoena of several pieces by Egon Schiele which
were claimed by their original owners following their exhibition at the Museum of Modem Art),
rev'd, 688 N.Y.S.2d 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (reversing on grounds that a subpoena duces
tecum does not constitute "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment); Menzel v. List, 267
N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1966) (finding in favor of a Jewish couple who abandoned a
painting when they fled Brussels just prior to the Nazi occupation), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608
(N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (modifying amount awarded to plaintiffs), rev'd on other grounds, 246
N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). Other courts have heard similar, although in many ways quite differ-
ent, cases, but they have been quite rare. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of
Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Indi-
ana law) (affirming the trial court's decision to return stolen mosaics, currently in the possession
of a good faith purchaser, to Cyprus). For an overview of cases involving art stolen during the
Second World War, see generally Constance Lowenthal, An Annotated Checklist of Cases and
Disputes Involving Art Wrongfully Taken During the Nazi Era and its Aftermath, SC40 A.LI.-
A.B.A. 11 (1998) (listing various art theft cases in the United States).
1 See Linda F. Pinkerton, Due Diligence in Fine Art Transactions, 22 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'LL. 1, 1-2. (1990). As this commentator explains:
Although common law and statutes in the United States provide that a thief cannot
convey good title and therefore not even a good faith purchaser for value can obtain
good title to an object purchased from a thief, the statute of limitations cutting off
1999]
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These exceptions, discussed at length below, consist of the Act of
State Doctrine, 12 Adverse Possession,13 the Demand-And-Refusal
Rule,14 and the Discovery Rule.15 When applying these various ex-
ceptions to the present issue, it is essential that the underlying goal or
purpose of the exceptions be gleaned. Any subsequent application of
one of these exceptions to the rule of title must meet or exceed the
policy purpose for the rule itself. Furthermore, because the asset at
issue here is "art," with all of its special cultural, physical, aesthetic,
and financial values, the title rule and any applicable exception to it
must take cognizance of these special values.
The chief goal of this Note is twofold. First, this Note intends to
show that because of the highly emotional nature of the issue, con-
scious effort must be taken to proceed slowly and rationally. 1 6 This
Note endeavors to show that existing art law has useful rules and,
while the present issue is undoubtedly unique, the application of these
doctrines merits discussion. While the Nazis were obviously quite
more than mere art thieves, many useful comparisons to "traditional"
stolen art title disputes can, and in order to avoid knee-jerk problem
solving, must be made.' 7 As a result of the special issues raised by
Holocaust victim art claims, domestic legislation, isolated from the
drama of the courtroom, must be enacted to balance the unique needs
of the two innocent parties to Second World War stolen art claims:
Holocaust victims and good faith purchasers.'8 Second, this Note
suggests that in light of the uniqueness of the assets in question and
the relevant historical context, an application of the Discovery Rule is
most appropriate to resolve the issues of contested title.
This Note is divided into four sections and addresses the issue of
art looted from private collectors during the World War II era.' 9 Sec-
stale claims and the doctrines of laches and adverse possession have offered effec-
tive exceptions to the common law rule.
Id. (citations omitted).
12 See infra Part II.C.
13 See infra Part lIH.A.
14 See infra Part l[.B.1.
15 See infra Part m.B.2.
16 See Lynn H. Nicholas, Introduction, in THE SPoiLs OF WAR: WORLD WAR II AND ITS
AFERMATH: THE Loss, REAPPEARANCE, AND RECOVERY OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 47, 47
(Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997) [hereinafter SPOILS OF WAR] (noting the "psychological and
emotional" effect from the lost art of World War I).
17 See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding that the
abandonment of artistic property by.the original owners "was no more voluntary than the relin-
quishment of property during a holdup," and that even under Nazi law, art cannot be classified
as lawful booty) (citations omitted), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (modi-
fying amount awarded to plaintiffs), rev'd on other grounds, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
1" See infra Part V.A.
19 This limitation exists because art looted from state collections create special problems
of international law and comity which are beyond the scope of this Note. See Julia A. McCord,
[Vol. 50:87
HOLOCAUST VICTIM FINE ARTS LITIGATION
tion II of this Note briefly outlines the historical background applica-
ble to many of the current ownership disputes. The significance of
this historical background is that, until quite recently, it has passed
with neither popular nor academic discussion. Section I of this Note
outlines the development and substance of the existing common law
affirmative defenses to a fine art title claim. Finally, Section IV of
this Note outlines an argument for a statutory application of the Dis-
covery Rule to title claims by Holocaust victims and other victims of
Nazi dispossession.20
I. BACKGROUND: THE PROBLEM
Recently, several European nations and industries began to make
reparations to the victims of the Holocaust for their part in collabo-
rating with the Nazis. These attempts have garnered much media at-
tention. Swiss banks, for example, recently offered $1.25 billion to
the victims of Nazi persecution in order to settle the class action suit
against the Swiss banking and insurance industry for their complicity
in the Nazi war effort.2 1 The issue of dispossessed art from World
War II, however, is not so easily resolved. Unlike fungible items
such as gold or money, each piece of art is unique. Thus, the disputes22
over stolen art raises more complicated problems. Additionally, the
sheer number of pieces stolen during the war, the extent of their sub-
sequent distribution, and the length of time that has since passed all
serve to exacerbate the problem.23
Note, The Strategic Targeting of Diligence: A New Perspective on Stemming the Illicit Trade in
Art, 70 IND. LJ. 985, 995-97 (1995) (addressing some of the problems of international law and
comity in the context of archeological looting).
20 Nothing in this Note is intended to undercut the tragic historical, social, and cultural
significance of the Holocaust.
21 See generally Stephen A. Denburg, Note, Reclaiming Their Past: A Survey of Jewish
Efforts to Restitute European Property, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 233 (1998) (focusing on the
efforts of Holocaust survivors and their heirs to reclaim lost real property in Europe); Lisa An-
derson, $1.2 Billion Holocaust Fund OK'd: Jewish Leaders Hail Decision by Swiss on Stolen
Ivar Assets, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1998, at NI (discussing Swiss banking settlement); William
Hall & John Authers, Spotlight Turns to Europe's Insurers: Insurance Industry Lawyer Predicts
Further Settlements Will Follow 'Like Dominoes,' FIN. TIMES (London), August 14, 1998, at 2
(stating that "in many respects, [European insurers] face a re-run of the critical campaign
mounted against the [Swiss] banks.").
22 See Daniel J. Bender, An Alternative Approach to Settling Disputes Over Stolen Art,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 12, 1998, at I (advocating an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for these
types of stolen art claims).
23 At the time of the writing of this Note, over 65 years have passed since Hitler's rise to
power in 1933.
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A. The Legacy of the Second World War
The pillaging of art treasures during war was neither a Nazi in-
vention nor was it peculiar to the Twentieth Century. Pillaging and
looting art treasures predates the Roman Empire and the practice can
be found in the records of the Assyrian Empire circa 700 BC.24 The
gathering of the spoils of war can even be found in the Old Testa-
ment.2 While it is clear from history that the Nazis did not invent
war-time art looting, the pillaging that occurred during the Second
World War was novel in the extent of "its scale, its ruthlessness, its
planning, and even its recording., 26 More priceless works of art were
seized between 1933 and 1945 than during all of the Napoleanic Wars
and the entire Thirty Years War.27 It is estimated that more than
100,000 pieces of art were looted from Jews and other "dissidents"
from both Western and Eastern Europe and in excess of 20,000 pieces
are estimated to still be unaccounted for.28 While the primary differ-
ence between the Second World War and prior wars was the scale of
the effort, there are other peculiarities worth noting. The most obvi-
ous innovation of the Second World War looting was that, "for the
first time in history, the armies of most of the belligerents had highly
trained art specialists in their ranks, whose duty it was to secure and
preserve movable works of art, and whose professionalism, no matter
what their ideology, saved most of the treasures of Europe for us." 29
Thousands of pieces of art were displaced by the war. Several
thousand pieces were taken from prominent Jewish collectors and
dealers. "Ordinary people, too, lost their art treasures, left behind in
their homes when they fled to freedom or were sent to death
24 See Jeanette Greenfield, The Spoils of War, in SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 16, at 34
(tracing the history of war-time looting from the earliest recorded history through the Roman
Empire, Viking Age, Crusades, Napoleonic Wars, and Colonization of Africa, the Americas and
Asia to the present day).
2 See Numbers 31:9, 31:25-27, 31:52-53 (New American Standard) ("And the sons of
Israel captured the women of Midian and their little ones; and all their cattle and all their flocks
and all their goods, they plundered .... Then the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, 'You and
Eleazar the priest and the heads of the fathers' households of the congregation, take a count of
the booty that was captured, both of man and of animal; and divide the booty between the war-
riors who went out to battle and all the congregation .... ' And all the gold of the offering
which they offered up to the Lord, from the captains of thousands and the captains of hundreds,
was 16,750 shekels. The men of war had taken booty, every man for himself.") (emphasis
omitted).
2 Greenfield, supra note 24, at 38.
27 See FELICIANO, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that 20,000 pieces of "Jewish-owned" art
was taken from France during World War 1).
28 See James Auer, Dealing with the legacy of Nazi art thefts, MILWAuKEE J. & SEN-
TINEL, Sept. 23, 1998, at 2E.
29 Lynn H. Nicholas, World War H and the Displacement ofArt and Cultural Property, in
SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 16, at 39.
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camps. 30 Some pieces were "donated" to prominent museums with
the understanding that they would be returned when the war ended.31
Some pieces were sold or exchanged in order to finance the cost of
living or escape, and some were just moved here and there, forgotten,
and later found. While each case was a unique and individual event
of personal loss, 32 many of the present cases do fall into a relatively
generalizable fact-pattern. As a result, a useful rule for dealing with
these cases can, and should, be made.
33
The art was looted from European Jews, Freemasons and other
"undesirables" in order that a great museum might be established in
Hitler's hometown of Linz.34 Also, much of the German high com-
mand sought out and collected works of art for their own personal
collections.35 The museum was to be stocked primarily with those
artists whom Hitler found most culturally valuable. Such painters as
Vermeer, Pieter Bruegel the Elder, Rembrandt, Hals, Fragonard, Van
Eyck, and Durer 6 were particularly targeted because, pursuant to the
Nazi aesthetic ideology, they represented "pure" Northern European
art of the highest order.37 Hitler was especially obsessed with undo-
ing the looting that occurred during the Napoleanic Wars of a century
30 Judith H. Dobrzynski, A Bulldog on the Heels of Lost Nazi Loot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1997, at El.
31 See FELICIANO, supra note 4, at 45, 48-49 (explaining how several pieces of the Roth-
schild Collection evaded Nazi confiscation by storage in the Louvre). •
32 See Nicholas, supra note 16, at 47. This commentator observes that:
Before we can search for lost objects, we must know what they are and determine
the exact circumstances of their displacement. We must discover if they were con-
fiscated by governments, stolen by individuals, sold willingly or under duress, bar-
tered for food, or simply hidden, forgotten, and randomly moved from place to
place. Only when these problems have been solved can the process of restitution
and compensation be undertaken, and then only on a case-by-case basis, in which,
inevitably, present-day political considerations and the emotional legacy of World
War II will be major factors.
Id.
3 The scenario, which in no way is meant to subtract anything from the suffering of huge
sections of the population of both Western and Eastern Europe, often breaks down in the fol-
lowing way: a piece of now very valuable art was looted by one of the belligerents from either a
"dissident" (Jewish, Gypsy or Slavic), or other art owner-or a prior looter-between the years
of 1933 and 1945. Over the course of the 54 years following the war, the piece was not returned
to its original owner and, for very legitimate reasons, its whereabouts were never ascertained
(either due to political opposition resulting from the Cold War and Communist control of East-
ern Europe, logistical barriers resulting from the disinterest of many of the formerly occupied
countries, or simply because of the massive quantity of art at issue). Today, because of the
reversal of these conditions, the pieces are being discovered in the possession of people who had
no idea of the piece's history and who have paid a large sum of money to acquire or insure the
work.
3 See FELICANO, supra note 4, at 15-16.
35 See id. at 31 (noting that besides Hitler himself, Hermann Goering was perhaps the
biggest "[fMriend of the [airts" in Nazi Germany).
36 See Appendix A.
37 See id. at 27. This "high" art is contrasted to the "low" or "degenerate" contemporary
art of the pre-World War II era. See id.
1999]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:87
earlier but sought to capture for Linz the "best" European art from the
1500s to the 1930s. 38 Hitler sought to repatriate works of "German
heritage" and, as a result, "[i]t stands as the cultural and aesthetic as-
pect of Hitler's project of conquest, next to its political, racial, eco-
nomic, and military components." 39 To further this end, an exhaus-
tive list of "Germanic" art was compiled. It was intended that when a
peace treaty was signed with a conquered country-most notably
France, Belgium and Holland-the pieces could be demanded for
reparations. 40 The treaties, however, never came to fruition, and as a
result, the looting, while alarmingly extensive, was often aimless and
piecemeal.
Some pieces of "German heritage" could not be plundered, often
because they were in the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet
Union or another not-yet-annexed Western European nation, and
therefore had to be purchased. The currency by which these pur-
chases were financed often came from the sale or exchange of seized
"degenerate" art.4 1 Hitler had already attacked Futurism, Dadaism
and Cubism in his Mein Kampf and, after his rise to power, continued
to purge the German people from the influence of this "spiritual mad-
ness."42 Despite its opposition to "degenerate" art, the Nazi high
command quickly realized the value of such "Judeo-Bolshevist"
modem artists as Pissaro, Kandinsky, Marc, Chagall, Klee, Matisse,
Dix, Ensor, Picasso, and Van Gogh. Starting in 1937, the Nazis auc-
tioned these pieces at several famous "Degenerate Art" shows that
were attended by numerous American, British and Belgian collectors
who had what the Nazi's needed most: hard currency. Joseph Pulit-
zer, for example, while on his honeymoon in 1939, acquired Ma-
tisse's Bathers with a Turtle at one such auction. 44  The proceeds
were then reinvested in more "acceptable" arty
" See id at 25.
39 Id. at 30; see also infra text accompanying note 72.
40 See id. at ch. 2 (outlining the rationale and massive scope of the "Kimmel Report").
41 See id. at 122-23 (noting that the Parisian art market actually experienced a huge up-
swing during the Nazi occupation and citing one contemporary observer who noted that a huge
cross-section of the population purchased this art simply because there was nothing else on
which to spend one's money).
42 See id. at 20-21 (quoting Hitler's Mein Kampf, wherein Hitler argued that it is the
"'duty of the State, and of its leaders, to prevent a people from falling under the influence of
spiritual madness').
43 See Brigid Grauman, Chagall and the Nazis, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 2-3, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 12733038.
44 See Nicholas, supra note 29, at 40.
4S See id. at 39. Ironically, these art shows proved to be a poor investment in that one of
the pieces sold at auction was Van Gogh's Portrait of Dr. Gachet, which has since been re-sold
to a Japanese collector in 1990 for $82.5 million. See id. However, the German art investment
strategy was premised on both German victory and the aesthetic tastes of the Fiihrer.
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The end of the war did not end the displacement of Europe's art
treasures; the purchased were intermixed with the looted and, in the
confusion surrounding the German collapse, much of the systematic
nature of the German looting was undone. As the Allies proceeded
through the formerly-occupied Europe and then Germany itself, huge
caches of art treasures were discovered in mines, hidden vaults, mon-
asteries, office buildings, homes, and even medieval castles.46  An
organized Allied effort to recover the looted art was begun two days
after the liberation of Paris.47 While attempts were made to salvage,
catalogue, and repatriate the treasures, the retrieval efforts were
largely in disarray and some Allied looting occurred 48 Each of the
major Allied powers set up recovery commissions and meetings were
held to determine what art was to be repatriated and what was to be
kept as war reparations; as Germany was carved up into four zones,
however, each of the controlling Allies went their own way.49
The British and the Americans set up the M.F.A. & A. (Monu-
ments, Fine Arts & Architecture), and attempted to set up collection
points in order to return the works to their original owners.50 Soviet
policy, however, was quite different. The Soviet Union, who had,
without question, suffered the worst damage of all the Allies, believed
that "reparation in kind should replace what the German army had
taken or destroyed. [As a result, in] Germany and the eastern Euro-
pean countries occupied by the Soviet army, few of the things owned
or plundered by the Nazis were returned to their owners." 51 When
Hitler had invaded Eastern Europe and Russia, he was "[c]onvinced
that the art of Slavic peoples did not represent anything of value...
[and as a result], deliberately and skillfully devastated [their] land. 52
The Soviet army thus took German-held art as compensation for
Slavic losses-regardless of the works' true owners.53 The French
46 See generally THOMAS CARR HOWE, JR., SALT MINES AND CASTLES: THE DISCOVERY
AND RESTITUTION OF LOOTED EUROPEAN ART (1946) (chronicling the experiences of Monu-
ments, Fine Arts, and Archives officers in Germany).
47 See FELICIANO, supra note 4, at 165.
43 See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that the Monet in
question was noticed missing as soon as U.S. soldiers left the castle where the painting was
being kept); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1155 (2d Cir. 1982)
(finding that priceless Dilerer paintings, purchased by defendant for $450 from a U.S. service-
man who appeared at his door in 1946, had been stolen from a German castle in 1945).
49 See NICHOLAS, supra note 4, at 382-84 (describing the lack of cooperation among
Allied powers).
50 See FELICIANO, supra note 4, at 173 (noting that the group was also concerned with
protection, recuperation, and restitution).
-" Id. at 173-74.
52 Nikolai Nikandrov, The Transfer of the Contents of German Repositories into the Cus-
tody of the USSR, in SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 16, at 117, 120.
" See Steven Costello, Must Russia Return the Artvork Stolen From Germany During
World War !?, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 142 (1997) (estimating that in excess of 2.5
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also seized German-held art in their own country. Thousands of these
repatriated works (in excess of 15,000) were taken to the Musees Na-
tionaux Recuperation, where their original ownership was, for the
most part, never investigated.54 Instead, these pieces were either held
"in trust" by the Louvre and other French museums or auctioned off.55
These pieces are now in countless museums and private collections
around the world, and many have been sold numerous times in both
Europe and the New World.
B. Holocaust Victims Art Cases: Past, Present, and Potential
Today, the international art trade is an unbelievably large and
complex international industry and is second in scale and profitability
only to the trafficking of illegal drugs.56 What makes the trade in art
particularly problematic is both the uniqueness of the objects traded
and the ease with which they are exported and hidden. In excess of
20,000 pieces of artwork looted during the Second World War remain
unaccounted for and are continuously redistributed by this trade.
58
These transactions have occurred in countless jurisdictions and legal
systems, both "code" and "common law," all over the world. Some
of its buyers know of their purchases' checkered past, but other buy-
ers, due in part to both the misrepresentations of dealers and the often
million artworks and over 10 million books were taken by the Soviets from Germany immedi-
ately following the war, but acknowledging that 1.5 million items were returned to East Ger-
many in 1955); Margaret M. Mastroberardino, Comment, The Last Prisoners of World War II, 9
PACE INT'L L. REv. 315, 324-26 (1997) (discussing the dispute between Germany and Russia
arising from the "Hidden Treasures Revealed" exhibit at the Hermitage Museum in St. Peters-
burg, Russia, in which seventy-four paintings by prominent Impressionist and Post-
Impressionist painters, which were thought to have been lost during the Second World War,
were displayed in the spring of 1995).
'4 See FELICIANO, supra note 4, at 215-20 (describing curators' evasive answers when
questioned about inventories and ownership investigations).
55 See Victoria Combe, Monet Taken by Nazis is Barred from Exhibition, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 31, 1998, at 15 (noting that a Monet worth £6,000,000, which is
now the subject of a claim by the heirs of a Holocaust victim, has been stored in the Musee des
Beaux-Arts in Caen since the end of the Second World War).
5 See Paige L. Margules, Note, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and Export
of Cultural Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation, and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 609, 610 (1992) (estimating the value of stolen art to range in the billions
of dollars).
s7 See McCord, supra note 19, at 989. As this author explains, the illegitimate trade of
stolen art flourishes under the art market's current practices:
The illicit trade in art and antiquities flourishes, in part, due to the very nature of the
art market. International trade in art is the norm, and for this reason, cultural patri-
mony can easily be taken out of its country of origin and sold to collectors and mu-
seums all over the world. Because the art trade encompasses legitimate as well as
illegitimate international dealings, the problem of deterring the flow of clandestine
objects is difficult to solve.
Id. (citations omitted).
58 See Auer, supra note 28, at 2E.
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murky nature of provenance, are wholly unaware. Today, these
pieces can be found in public museums and private collections around
the world and do not come to light until they happen to catch the eye
of a victim or an heir. 9
Recent political and technological developments have brought to
light many World War II records not available before and, as a result,
numerous claims for the return of art have surfaced in the last several
years-often after being featured in one of the two books mentioned
above.60  These claims, and the increasing risk of others like them,
have upset the art world. 61 This upset is due not so much to the
claims themselves, but instead because of the great length of time that
has passed since the works were stolen.62  In late 1997, two paintings
by Egon Schiele, which were part of a traveling exhibition at the New
York Museum of Modem Art and owned by the nation of Austria,
were claimed by heirs of Holocaust victims.63 Later reports suggested
that other Schieles, held in American museums such as the Museum
of Modem Art in New York, the Art Institute of Chicago, and even
the Allen Memorial Museum at Oberlin College in Ohio, may also
have dubious titles.64 Holocaust victims have pressed similar claims
against a Degas pastel, Landscape with Smokestacks, owned by a
Chicago collector and on display at the Art Institute of Chicago;65 a
59 See Mastroberardino, supra note 53, at 318 (noting that much of this work is held in the
former Soviet Union and that the Hermitage, a major Russian art museum, has a collection of
just fewer than a million pieces which have, until recently, been inaccessible to the West).
6 See Nicholas, supra note 16, at 47 ("With the end of the Cold War and the opening up
of Eastern Europe, it has become apparent that large numbers of works of art previously thought
to be lost are, in fact, stored in repositories in countries of the former Soviet Union. Conversely,
reestablishment of communications with these nations has enabled Western officials to identify
displaced objects that appear in their own jurisdictions.'); Denburg, supra note 21, at 234
("Thousands of Jews throughout the former Soviet bloc were not compensated because their
Communist governments did not allow them to file claims with the West German Govern-
ment") (citations omitted).
61 See Philippe de Montebello, Letter, Nazi Stolen Art, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at A18
(arguing that "only in the past few years, since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the opening of
long-concealed files, has the means existed to sort out this tragic chapter of world history. Only
now can we anticipate the development of data bases that would link claimants to missing
works.").
62 See Lee Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims: Art With a History, WvALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1999,
at A18 ("[I]t is no simple matter to determine whether a particular work was stolen more than 50
years ago and never handed back. And identifying today's legitimate claimants can be tricky,
when so many of the original possessors have succumbed to genocide or old age.").
63 See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Modem is Urged to Play Solomon in Paintings Dispute,
N.Y. TMEEs, Jan. 1, 1998, at El.
64 See Judith H. Dobrzynski, More Paintings By Schiele Face Ownership Questions, N.Y.
TMEs, Jan. 15, 1998, at B4.
65 See Kevin M. Williams, Degas Settlement Lands in Uncharted Territory, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 43. The parties to the Degas lawsuit began settlement negotiations in
mid-August 1998. See iL The August settlement, however, has since stalled. See Rosenbaum,
supra note 62, at Al 8 (announcing victims' plan to split the value of the painting with the cur-
rent owner and seller).
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Wtewaelt painting held by the Panamanian company, Cobert Fi-
nance;66 a Monet held by the Metropolitan Museum of Art;67 a L6ger
at the Minneapolis Institute of Arts;68 and Matisse's Odalisque held
by the Seattle Museum of Art.69 In Canada, the Mus6e des Beaux-
Arts de Montr6al has been defending its claim to a 16'h century
painting by the Florentine artist Giorgio Vasari against a claim made
by an art museum in Budapest since 1964.70 Museum administrators
and art lovers have criticized the claims, arguing that they will have a
chilling effect onthe international exhibition of art.71 Unfortunately,
they may be right. Recently, two paintings by Pierre Bonnard were
pulled from a retrospective of the artist specifically because of the
debate raised by the Schiele exhibit.72 It is likely that collections of
European Masters and modem artists, because of their respective
aesthetic and fiscal value to the Nazis, will be most effected.73 Fur-
thermore, as more heirs come forward, these claims will continue to
surface, and continue to disrupt the art market, private collectors, and
museums.
C. International Statutory Attempts to Address the Problem74
For the most part, international treaties have done little to resolve
the present problem. Indeed, the existence of an international conven-
tion on point did little to stop the wholesale plunder of Europe during
the Second World War.75 These treaties, however, have had two in-
teresting and important effects: they have (1) signaled an international
consensus for intolerance of this type of war-time behavior, and
66 See Will Bennett, Looted Old Master is sent back to Germany by court, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 10, 1998, at 12 (detailing a British court's adjudication of a title
claim of a 17th century Dutch painting, The Holy Family with Saints John and Elizabeth and
Angels, by Joachim Wtewael).
67 See Rosenbaum, supra note 61, at A18; see also Appendix B.
68 See id.; see also Appendix C.
69 See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Seattle Museum is Sued for a Looted Matisse, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 1998, at E3; Regina Hackett, Seattle Museum Sued over Artwork; Dealer's Heirs Claim
Matisse Painting was Looted by Nazis, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 1, 1998, at Al;
Tunku Varadarajan, Gallery is Sued Over 'Looted' Art, TMES (London) Aug. 5, 1998, at 11.
The Seattle Art Museum case is significant in that, for the first time, a museum is being sued
directly for an asset seized by the Nazis. See Appendix D.
70 See Nomi Morris, On the Trail ofLooted Art, MACLEAN's, July 27, 1998, at 48, 49.
71 See Alan G. Artner, Ethics and Art: Museums Struggle for Correct Response to Stolen
Art Claims, CHt. TRiB., Aug. 16, 1998, at C6.
72 See Francine Cunningham, Art with a Dubious Past, IRISH TISs, Aug. 12, 1998, at 11.
73 See Michael Dobbs, Stolen Beauty, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, (Magazine), at 12
(noting that a library in Lvov, Ukraine now demands the return of a looted 499 year-old Ddirer
print (Appendix A), currently held by the National Gallery of Art, that had been displayed in
Hitler's own field headquarters on the Russian Front); Artner, supra note 71, at C6 (noting that
threats of lawsuits over two Schiele canvases and one by Matisse "immediately raised fears of
collectors refusing to loan major paintings to large international exhibitions or ... queues of
claimants dramatically reducing the nation's European masterpieces").
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(2) made the defense of the Act of State Doctrine76 inapplicable to
World War H-era looting.77 Several treaties have been enacted since
the 1945 armistice, most notably the Hague Convention of 195478 and
UNESCO Convention of 1970, 79 but have not been the basis for
Holocaust victims' fine arts claims. 0 While these treaties do not have
a statute of limitations in their terms, there seems to be a growing in-
ternational consensus that some repose of title is necessary. An illus-
tration of this sentiment is seen in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention
on Stolen or illegally Exported Cultural Objects which provides that
"[a]ny claim for restitution shall be brought within a period of three
years from the time when the claimant knew the location of the cul-
tural object and the identity of its possessor, and in any case within a
period of fifty years from the time of the theft."8' While this suggests
an interest in the eventual quieting of title, it must be remembered that
the convention was enacted with the understanding that a claimant
might still have a claim to the object under the terms of the 1954
Hague Convention.
D. Art Industry Attempts to Address the Problem
Claims of this type present a real threat to museums, auction
houses and private collectors who have spent significant amounts of
money on good faith purchases of what is later discovered to be "du-
74 A detailed analysis of relevant international and domestic legislation is outside the
scope of this Note.
7- See, e.g., Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, arts. 47, 53, 36 Stat. 2277 (prohibiting pillaging and limiting confiscation to property of
the state).
76 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (holding that the
Act of State Doctrine consists of four elements: (a) the taking must be by a foreign sovereign
government; (b) the taking must be within the territorial limitations of that government; (c) the
foreign government must be extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit; and (d) the
taking must not be violative of a treaty obligation).
'n See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 811-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (summarizing the
state of international law on the issue of pillaging, and holding that because the acts violated the
Hague Convention of 1907, none of the elements of the Act of State doctrine were met), modi-
fled, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (modifying amount awarded to plaintiffs), rev'd
on other grounds, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
78 UNESCO Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, done May 14, 1954,249 U.N.T.S. 215.
79 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, opened for signature Nov. 14, 1970,
823 U.N.T.S. 231.
0 See SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 16, app. at 272, 287-301 (noting that while the U.S. is a
party to the 1970 treaty, it is not a party to the more extensive 1954 treaty).
81 The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, opened
for signature June 24, 1995, art. 3(3), 34 LL.M. 1322 (emphasis added) (adopting both the De-
mand-and-Refusal Rule and a strict, albeit lengthy, limitations period).
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bious" art. 2 As a result, it is no surprise that museums have begun to
scour their collections for art of questionable title 8 3 In a remarkable
world-wide effort, several extra-governmental organizations have
been established in order to address the situation, and the Art Loss
Register, an extensive database of stolen works of art financed by
several prominent auction houses, has announced an initiative to
identify as yet unidentified pieces.84 Several organizations all over
the world are in the process of compiling lists and on-line databases,
and even offer legal advice on the making of an art claim.85 The so-
called "Jewish Masterlist," which currently has 3000 entries, is ex-
pected to eventually contain 250,000 items.86 These databases, which
will undoubtedly include pieces of significant financial value, will
render the entries effectively unmarketable.8 7 Despite the present co-
operation, however, it is unlikely that an industry-wide settlement will
develop as it has in the European banking and insurance industries.
This is due, in perhaps the largest part, to the sheer number of parties
involved in this dispute, and it is likely that the "free-rider problem"
would effectively quash any such attempt at a large class settlement.
88
82 It should be noted that without a reasonable investigation into the title of a piece, a
purchase cannot be considered to have been made "in good faith." See Landes & Posner, supra
note 9, at 190. Landes and Posner define a good faith purchaser as:
[O]ne who, having made the optimal investment in obtaining information about the
title of the work prior to purchase, believes that there is a very high probability that
the seller can transfer good title to him. That is, not only is his belief that the seller
can transfer good title to him sincere; it is also reasonable because the cost of addi-
tional investigation would exceed the savings from rejecting the work should its title
prove defective discounted by the very low probability that the additional investiga-
tion would reveal that the seller's title was indeed defective.
Id.
'3 See Simon Macklin, Hitler's Prized Looted Draving in British Museum, Taskforce
Told, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22027396 (noting that
Britain's 21 museums have established a taskforce to review the museums' extensive collections
for pieces of questionable provenance). Perhaps not surprisingly, however, as of early 1999, no
participating museum has found any work of questionable heritage. See Rosenbaum, supra note
62, at AlS.
84 See United States Holocaust Museum (visited Dec. 26, 1998)
<http://www.ushmm.orglassetslushmm4.htm> (summarizing several nations' efforts to address
the issue of Holocaust victims' art and other asset claims).
85 See Holocaust Claims Processing Office (visited Oct. 17, 1998)
<http://www.claims.state.ny.us/> (outlining the process for recovery and offering the help of the
New York Banking Department as an advocate for citizen claims).
86 See Godfrey Barker, Why These Masterpieces may now be Worthless, EVENING
STANDARD (London), Sept. 30, 1998, at 28.
87 See id. (stating that "[e]very work that goes onto the ALR's Jewish Masterlist is set to
come off the market-above ground, anyway-unless its former owners issue a reprieve. Unre-
prieved, it will lose most of its value. That may mean justice for the past but its opposite for the
present").
88 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRmR, PROPERTY 49-50 (4th ed. 1998). These
commentators explain that:
The freerider reasons that no contribution to a group payment is necessary because
the contributions of others will amount to enough to induce X to change, so that the
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Furthermore, good faith purchasers, who often have no action against
a seller due to the passage of time,89 will be forced to either forfeit
these pieces or simply keep them from public display. Be this as it
may, it is unclear if large museums will comply with the principles
advanced by the Association of Art Museum directors?)
In December of 1998, forty-four countries met in Washington
D.C. to address the problem. 91 The result of this conference was an
agreement on non-binding guidelines to search for and return these
assets.92 The result of all this attention, however, may not be the re-
freerider benefits at no cost .... The costs of overcoming freeriding can be high; if
many people are involved, they can be prohibitive.
Id. Further, "a problem similar to freeriding-and one that, like freeiding, occasions high
transaction costs-arises when payments must be made to a group in order to carry out a trans-
action, and where, unless each member of the group accepts payment, the transaction fails en-
tirely." Ik at 50 n.26.
f'9 The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, provides that:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties
may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack ofknowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery is made ....
U.C.C. § 2-725 (1), (2) (1990) (emphasis added).
Note that "warranty" here includes "warranty of title." See U.C.C. § 2-312 (1)(a) (1990)
C'Mhere is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that.., the title conveyed shall be
good.").
90 See Stephanie Cash, Two Museums Return Stolen Artifacts, ART IN AM., April 1999, at
27 (contrasting the return policies of the Getty Museum and the Metropolitan Museum of Art);
Rosenbaum, supra note 62, at A18 (noting that the recent Monet exhibition at the Boston Mu-
seum of Fine Arts contained a 1904 Water Lilies claimed by the heirs of Saul Rosenberg in clear
violation of the AAMD's strong policy of not borrowing and displaying such works).
9' See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Albright Speaks With Emotion at Holocaust Conference,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1998, at A6 (describing the format and listing the speakers scheduled at the
three-day conference).
92 The conference adopted the following principles:
In developing a consensus on non-binding principles to assist in resolving issues re-
lating to Nazi-confiscated art, the Conference recognizes that among participating
nations there are differing legal systems and that countries act within the context of
their own laws.
L Art that had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted
should be identified.
II. Relevant records and archives should be open and accessible to researchers,
in accordance with the guidelines of the International Council on Archives.
11L Resources and personnel should be made available to facilitate the identifi-
cation of all art that had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently
restituted.
IV. In establishing that a work of art had been confiscated by the Nazis and not
subsequently restituted, consideration should be given to unavoidable gaps
or ambiguities in the provenance in light of the passage of time and the cir-
cumstances of the Holocaust era.
V. Every effort should be made to publicize art that is found to have been con-
fiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted in order to locate its
pre-War owners or their heirs.
VI. Efforts should be made to establish a central registry of such information.
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turn of any looted art. These sweeping acts are just as likely to chill
international exhibition and push the international trade of these
pieces either underground or to countries that do not acknowledge the
agreement. Furthermore, while it is too soon to tell, there is no reason
to assume that museum compliance will be any better under these
guidelines than under any of the previous non-binding "principles. 93
To be sure, the test cases that have arisen to date are quite
strong.94 The publicity given to these pieces, especially pieces of high
fiscal value, will inevitably lead to abuse, and nuisance suits will
abound. They will prey upon popular opinion, and justice will not be
served. This is especially true when the provenances of all of the art
that passed through Europe in the late 1930 and early 1940s are mud-
died by the confusion of the era. How is a court to tell the difference
between the title of a piece sold legally in 1939 and one stolen in
1940 when there are no records for either, and all of the parties have
since died?
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND THEIR EFFICACY
One difficulty with the study of stolen art stems from the fact
that so much of the stolen art is transported across state and national
boundaries and, as a result, presents difficult questions of interna-
VII Pre-War owners and their heirs should be encouraged to come forward and
make known their claims to art that was confiscated by the Nazis and not
subsequently restituted.
VIM If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the
Nazis and not subsequently restituted, or their heirs, can be identified, steps
should be taken expeditiously to a just and fair solution, recognizing this
may vary according to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific
case.
IX. If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the
Nazis, or their heirs, can not be identified, steps should be taken expedi-
tiously to achieve a just and fair solution.
X. Commissions or other bodies established to identify art that was confis-
cated by the Nazis and to assist in addressing ownership issues should have
a balanced membership.
XI. Nations are encouraged to develop national processes to implement these
principles, particularly as they relate to alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms for resolving ownership disputes.
Washington Conference Principles On Nazi-Confiscated Art (visited Dec. 26, 1998)
<http:llwww.state.gov/www/regionsleur/981203_heacarLprinc.html>.
93 See, e.g., e-mail from Scott Wargo, Director of Media Relations for the Allen Memorial
Art Museum in Oberlin, Ohio, to Stephan I SchlegelniIch, Author (Mar. 9, 1999) (quoting the
Official Statement of Oberlin College Policy on Disputed Art which states that while the mu-
seum has an interest in protecting itself from "inauthentic and opportunistic claims," it would be
"immoral and wrong" for the museum to retain possession of a piece which "rigorous review"
has revealed to have been looted during the Second World War) (on file with author and avail-
able upon request at <http://www.oberlin.edu/allenart>).
94 See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
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tional and domestic choice of law. 95 Because of the scope of the is-
sue, this Note must be limited to an analysis of the common law doc-
trines. Unfortunately, it will be necessary to simply state that in civil
law countries-countries perhaps not ironically, where much of this
art originates or is purchased-a thief may effectively transfer title to
a good faith purchaser of the goods.96 Conversely, in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada and other common law coun-
tries, a thief cannot convey good title regardless of the good faith of
the purchaser. The rule, however, is not without its affirmative de-
fenses and statutes of limitations.
97
A. Introduction to the Doctrine of Worthier Title and its
Exceptions
The common law formulation of the doctrine of worthier title is
that a thief cannot convey good title when he resells something that
he has stolen. The result is the same, regardless of how many times
the item in question has been resold. As a result, in an action against
even a good faith purchaser (who may have himself purchased from a
good faith purchaser), the original owner will win.98 According to the
U.C.C., "[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor
had or had power to transfer .... 99 The results of the rule's applica-
tion have often been severe, and as a result, courts have sought to
soften the harshest results. To accomplish this, courts have applied
both statutes of limitations for actions of replevin and the doctrine of
adverse possession,°° to claims for chattels for over a century. 01 The
doctrine of adverse possession is an equitable one that works simi-
95 See, e.g., Charash v. Oberlin College 14 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Ohio
statute of limitations rle, rather than that of New York, applied to this action concerning the
alleged conversion of fine art); 2 FRANKLIN FELDMAN Er AL., ART LAW: RIGHTS AND LI-
ABILIES OF CREATORS AND COLLECTORS § 11.1.7 (1986) (citing Winkworth v. Christie, Man-
son & Woods, Lid., 1 Ch. 497 (1979), for the proposition that Great Britain's choice of law rule,
for example, requires an application of the law of the place where the transaction occurred).
96 See Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Property and World War II: Some Implications for
American Museums: A Legal Background, SC40 A.LI.-A.B.A. 17, 19 (1998) (noting that most
civil code countries have rules which favor bona fide purchasers in disputes over title).
97 See id. at 19-20 (summarizing several of the legal defenses to a title claim and noting
the dismally small likelihood of their success).
98 These actions frequently sound in replevin, a cause of action that has been used for
years as a vehicle for quieting title. See, e.g., Seebold v. Eustermann, 13 NYV.2d 739, 745
(Minn. 1944) ("[Replevin] is a means of trying title to property .... It is an appropriate form of
action in which to determine which of two contending parties is the owner.").
9 U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1995).
1C' See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM El AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7 (Student ed. 1984)
("Adverse possession is a strange and wonderful system, whereby the occupation of another's
land gains the occupier title-but only if the occupation is indeed wrongful.").
"J1 See Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103
YALE W. 2437, 2442 (1994) (outlining a brief history of the doctrine of adverse possession as
applied to the law of chattel).
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larly to, and often in conjunction with, a statute of limitations. In or-
der for a possessor to gain title by adverse possession, the possession
must be (1) exclusive, (2) open and notorious, (3) under a claim of
right, and (4) continuous for the required statutory period.10 2 The ra-
tionale underlying the doctrine of adverse possession has been that
the rule
has not for its object to reward the diligent trespasser for his
wrong nor yet to penalize the negligent and dormant owner
for sleeping upon his rights; the great purpose is automati-
cally to quiet all titles which are openly and consistently as-
serted, to provide proof of meritorious titles, and correct er-
rors in conveyancing.1
0 3
While courts have been willing to recognize "legal" title in the pos-
sessor, they are often unwilling to recognize "marketable" title.'04
Therefore, an adverse possessor may exclusively possess property
acquired this way but often must await formal adjudication in order to
sell the property.05 In addition to this great limitation, the affirma-
tive defense has several other shortcomings worth noting.
The primary shortcoming of the doctrine of adverse possession is
that it was developed in a far different time to address different con-
cerns. It was initially meant to apply to real property and later, when
applied to the law of chattel, was primarily used as a defense to a
claim for the return of lost or stolen livestock.' °6 Applying the rule of
adverse possession to livestock made sense in the insular, agrarian
communities of a century ago. The "[a]nimals grazed on open land
and were visible to the public."'1 7  Further, "[c]ommunities were
much smaller and word of mouth much more potent."'0 8 When the
law shifted in favor of good faith purchasers, it did so because, in ef-
fect, courts sought to reward the possessors for "feeding and caring
for the animal" and punish the owner for laziness.10 9 Over time,
courts began to apply the doctrine to other less conspicuous items,
12 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 100, at § 11.7.
103 Henry W. Ballantine, Title By Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918) (cita-
tions omitted).
1o4 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 100, § 11.7 n.1 (noting the difference between "legal"
and "marketable" title in the law of real property).
105 See id. ("The only certain way to make the title marketable is to establish a paper record
by a favorable court decision.").
106 See Bibas, supra note 101, at 2442.
T07 Id. at 2443.
10 Id.
109 Id. (explaining how, as society moved away from agrarianism, the rationale of the rule
became less persuasive).
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and in doing do, the rationale disappeared. Slowly, the law shifted
back to a stance more protective of owners. Today, when it comes to
small mobile objects such as art, several "jurisdictions have replaced
adverse possession law with various balancing-test doctrines,"' ° and
for many "traditional" stolen or misplaced art claims, this doctrinal
shift is proper.
B. Judicial Modifications of Adverse Possession of Fine Art
The modifications to the rule of adverse possession for fine art
can generally be broken down into two categories: the Discovery
Rule and the Demand-and-Refusal Rule. Both rules are premised on
a judicial cognizance of the need to treat art differently. The courts
that have addressed the issue have found it necessary to deviate from
both a rule that favors original owners exclusively and a strict appli-
cation of the doctrine of the adverse possession of chattels which is
often used in conjunction with a legislated statute of limitations. Both
modifications are attempts to recognize the mobility, concealability,
and financial value of art and balance the interests of both the original
owner and the subsequent good faith purchaser. While the issue of
stolen art and its recovery is significantly widespread, very few juris-
dictions have even dealt with the issue."' With the busy adjudicative
future prompted by the rise of World War II claims, it seems as if the
remaining jurisdictions will be forced to adopt one of these rules, or
one of their own design. The purpose of this Note is to argue that
jurisdictions which have yet to face this issue (World War II art
claims for art looted from private parties) should treat them as a more
"traditional" stolen-art case and apply some sort of statute of limita-
tions. The Note also advocates the Discovery Rule as a proper bal-
ance between the rights of victims and subsequent good faith pur-
chasers.
1. The Demand-and-Refusal Rule (and its Modifications)
The Demand-and-Refusal Rule has its origins in the seminal case
of Menzel v. List.12 The plaintiffs in Menzel abandoned their Chagall
110 Id. at 2442; see also O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980) (applying the Dis-
covery Rule in determining whether the original owner had waited too long to bring her action
for the return of three paintings she claimed were stolen in the 1940s). The Discovery Rule is
discussed infra at Part ll.B.
11 See supra text accompanying note 10.
112 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y.App. Div.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
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gouache"13 when they fled Brussels prior to the invasion of the Nazi
army in 1941.114 The piece was eventually purchased by the Perls
Gallery and sold to the Lists in 1955.115 The piece's provenance for
the intervening years was unclear. In 1962 Mrs. Menzel located the
piece in the possession of List and demanded its return. 116 When List
refused to return the piece, the plaintiff filed a complaint in a New
York State court. The Menzel court held that the statute of limitations
tolled until the original owner learned of the work's whereabouts and
demanded its return.117 The limitations period began to run as soon as
the subsequent possessor refused the demand. 18 As a result of this
holding, the court ruled that the defendants had either to return the
piece or pay Mrs. Menzel $22,500 (its present value).1 19
Thirteen years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit applied the New York demand and refusal rule to the
adverse possession of fine art in Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Eli-
cofon.120  The defendant in Elicofon had purchased two extremely
valuable 15d1 Century Duerer paintings from an U.S. serviceman in
1946. He then displayed these paintings in his home-it is unclear if
Mr. Elicofon knew of the real value of the artwork-and held them
without interruption until 1966.121 The paintings had been looted
during the American occupation of the castle Schloss-Schwarzburg in
Thurgingia immediately following the war. 122 The defendant discov-
ered the true value of the pieces in 1966 and the discovery was pub-
lished in the New York Times. Immediately thereafter, the nations of
East and West Germany and the Grand Duchess of Saxony-Weimar
individually demanded their return. The demands were refused and a
suit, which was to last eleven years, was initiated.
123
The Elicofon court adopted the Menzel rule and held that the
statute of limitations was tolled until a demand and subsequent refusal
occurred. 124 The court ruled against the good faith purchaser, holding
that while a statute of limitations does exist for the cause of action for
the painting's return, it does not begin to run until the owner actually
113 "Goache" is defined as "a watercolor paint which, when dry, becomes opaque. It is
commonly used on its own or in combination with transparent watercolor" LAURIE SCHNEIDER
ADAMs, A HISTORY OF WESTERN ART 352 (1994).
114 See Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 808-09.
"' See id. at 809.
"9 See Id. at 808.
120 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
"' See id. at 1155.
122 See id. at 1155-56; see also supra text accompanying note 48.
123 See Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1156.
124 See id. at 1160-64.
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finds the piece, demands its return, and the possessor refuses the de-
mand.1 5 Despite a contrary application of New York law in a federal
court in the late 1980s, the State of New York continues to apply this
rule today.
26
2. The Discovery Rule
The Discovery Rule, as applied to claims for stolen art, was es-
tablished by the equally seminal case of O'Keeffe v. Snyder 27 In
O'Keeffe, the plaintiff, the painter Georgia O'Keeffe, alleged that she
had been robbed of two paintings in 1946.128 She did not report the
theft to the New York Police Department, and soon was distracted by
the death of her husband, Alfred Stieglitz. O'Keeffe finally reported
the theft in 1972 and discovered the painting's whereabouts in
1975.129 When her demand for the works' return was refused, she
instituted an action for replevin. The defendant alleged that he had
purchased the pieces in 1975 from a Mr. Frank, who had owned the
pieces since 1965 and exhibited them at a small art show in New Jer-
sey in 1968.30 The defendant had been given the pieces by his father
and alleged that he had remembered seeing the pieces in his father's
home as early as 1941.T
Faced with this quandary, the New Jersey Supreme Court opted
not to apply the New York rule articulated in Menzel v. List. 32 In-
stead, the court adopted the Discovery Rule, an equitable balancing
test. 33  "The discovery rule provides that, in an appropriate case, a
cause of action will not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by
12 See id. at 1166 (affirming the district court's determination that Kuntsammlungen zu
Weimar (East Germany) was entitled to possession of the painting).
126 See infra Part LI.B.3 (discussing Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubbell, 569
N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991), wherein a New York court applied the Strict Demand-and-Refusal
Rule).
"7 416 A.2d 862 (NJ. 1980).
128 See iii at 865-66.
'29 See iL
'3 See id. at 866.
131 See id.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 112-19.
133 The Discovery Rule was first developed for use in medical malpractice and tort law
where an injury might not be noticeable until long after the statute of limitations had run. See
John G. Petrovich, Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statues of
Limitations, 27 UCLA L REV. 1122, 1152 (1980). For application of the Discovery Rule, see,
e.g., Malapanis v. Shirazi, 487 N.E.2d 533,536-37 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (holding in this medi-
cal malpractice action that "Massachusetts does not require discovery of each of the elements of
the cause of action.., before the limitations clock in [Massachusetts' limitations statute] starts
ticking"); Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731,734-35 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Oklahoma
law and holding that in this products liability case "[tihe statute of limitations begins to run
when a reasonably prudent person associates his symptoms with a serious or permanent condi-
tion and at the same time perceives the role which the defendant has played in inducing that
condition").
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exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discov-
ered, facts which form the basis of a cause of action."'134 The rule is
meant to be applied on a case-by-case basis and to balance the rela-
tive interests of the competing parties. 135 The rule "shifts the empha-
sis from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the owner.
The focus of the inquiry will no longer be whether the possessor has
met the tests of adverse possession, but whether the owner has acted
with due diligence in pursuing his or her personal property. 136 The
court then went on to contrast traditional adverse possession with this
new doctrine. "Under the doctrine of adverse possession, the burden
is on the possessor to prove the elements of adverse possession. Un-
der the discovery rule, the burden is on the owner (the one seeking the
benefit of the rule) to establish facts that would justify deferring the
beginning of the period of limitations.' '137 As a result, the court re-
manded the suit to the trial court for a determination of whether
O'Keeffe had acted reasonably enough under the circumstances to
enable her to recover the piece and if the statute of limitations had run
out.
138
3. The Due Diligence Rule
The Due Diligence Rule is effectively the same as the preceding
Discovery Rule in that it requires the rightful owner to search dili-
gently (and the purchaser to investigate diligently 139) in order to toll
the statute of limitations. 14° The rule tends to protect theft victims at
the expense of good faith purchasers while at the same time reward-
ing the purchaser who publicly displays the purchased work.
In DeWeerth v. Baldinger,141 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the verdict of the trial court which had
"4 O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 869 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
135 See In re Marriage of Wanic, 445 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (IIl. App. Ct. 1983) ("In deter-
mining whether to apply the discovery rule to a particular cause of action, the supreme court has
employed a test which balances the increase in the difficulties of proof with the passage of time
against the hardship to the plaintiff who is unaware of his cause of action."); Raymond v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 174 (N.H. 1977) ("The discovery rule is based upon equitable con-
siderations; in determining whether and how the rule should be applied we must identify, evalu-
ate and weigh the interests of the opposing parties.").
136 O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
137 Id. at 873 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
131 See id. at 876-77 (permitting also the rule of tacking of periods of possession so long as
there is privity between the possessing parties). Rather than face a retrial, the parties settled.
O'Keeffe took one piece, Snyder took another, and Sotheby's auctioned off the third piece to
cover the parties' legal expenses. See DuKEu]NIER & KRIBR, supra note 88, at 161.
139 Without a reasonable investigation of title, a purchase cannot be considered to have
been done in "good faith."
140 See Bibas, supra note 101, at 2448 (arguing that despite the abundance of labels, the
doctrines of laches, due diligence and discovery are functional equivalents).
141 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'g 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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found that an original owner's claim for a Monet that had been looted
during the Second World War was not barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 142 The appellate court found that the plaintiff, while searching
diligently from 1943 to 1957, had not done anything from 1957 until
a nephew discovered the painting in 1981.143 The court in DeWeerth
applied what was essentially the Discovery Rule, because the judges
found that the plaintiff had unreasonably delayed her demand. 1
44
A New York state court responded to this application of its law
in the opinion of Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubbell. 45
The Guggenheim court rejected the Second Circuit's reasoning and
returned to a strict Demand-and-Refusal Rule. They did so, however,
in such a way as to leave the door open to the possibility of an appli-
cation of the equitable balancing of the Discovery Rule.146 Further-
more, before Guggenheim reached final adjudication, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the Due Dili-
gence Rule in a decision that returned a piece to the original owner.147
As a result, while New York has opposed an application the Due
Diligence Rule, the holding may live on in the Federal system and
does control within the common law of the state of New Jersey. The
continued application of the balancing test (by whatever name) is not
a sign of poor or misguided adjudication, but a judicial recognition of
the special nature of art claims.
142 See id at 104.
143 See id at 105 (stating that the piece was discovered in published volume of Monet's
works that was in a library near the plaintiff's home, where she had simply failed to look).
144 See id. at 109 (stating that the policies of quieting stale claims and fairness to the de-
fendant "would be frustrated if plaintiffs were free to delay actions for the return of stolen prop-
erty until the property's location fortuitously came to their attention.") (citations omitted).
'4' 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
'46 See id. at 431 (finding that the museum's attempts to locate the piece were less than
aggressive and stating that "[d]espite our conclusion that the imposition of a reasonable dili-
gence requirement on the museum would be inappropriate for purposes of the Statute of Limita-
tions, our holding today should not be seen as either sanctioning the museum's conduct or sug-
gesting that the museum's conduct is no longer an issue in this case").
147 See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
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III. THE DIscovERY RULE: A MODEST PROPOSAL
"Le pass9 est, par difinition, un donnJ que rien
ne modifiera plus. " 48
The Seattle Art Museum (the "S.A.M.") was sued for the return
of Matisse's Odalisque in late July 1998.149 Prentice Bloedel had
purchased the piece, which has been valued at approximately $2 mil-
lion, from the Knoeder Gallery in New York in 1954.150 The gallery
had told Mr. Bloedel that the painting had been held by the artist until
1938, and that the provenance was free and clear in 1954.151 The
piece was in the possession of the Bloedels from 1954 to 1991 when
it was donated to the S.A.M..152 The piece had been exhibited at the
S.A.M. and at the Washington Gallery of Modem Art in Washington,
D.C. in 1966 and 1967.153 Prentice Bloedel died in 1996.154
In October 1997, the S.A.M. received a letter from the heirs of
Paul Rosenberg, a prominent Parisian art dealer before the fall of
Paris in 1941.55 The heirs learned of the painting's whereabouts after
it had been featured in the 1997 book, The Lost Museum: The Nazi
Conspiracy to Steal the World's Greatest Works of Art by Hector Fe-
liciano. 156 The museum looked into the matter, but in July of 1998,
told the family that they would have to sue for the painting's return.
The family did so, and the museum in turn sued the Knoedel Gallery
for breach of the warranty of title, fraud, and negligent misrepresen-
tation.1
5 7
As an illustration of the problem analyzed in this Note, the
S.A.M. case is ideal. The "theft" occurred 56 years before the de-
mand for the painting's return. The "original owner" was a private
collector (as opposed to a state museum), and there is at least some
question as to whether the piece was sold in 1939 or looted in 1941.58
The purchase was made in good faith-33 years prior-and both the
148 MARC BLOCH, APOLOGIE POUR L'HISTOIRB, OU Mf rrER D'HISTORiEN 58 (7"' Ed.
1974) ("The past is, by definition, a datum which nothing in the future will change.") (translated
from the original French by Peter Putnam).
149 See Hackett, supra note 69, at Al.
'so See id. at Al.
151 See Hackett, supra note 1, at El.
152 See id.
153 See id.
1-4 See Robin Updike, Author Says Painting is Stolen, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at
Fl.
155 See id
156 See FELICIANO, supra text accompanying note 4.
157 See Hackett, supra note 1, at El.
158 See Updike, supra note 154, at F1 (stating that the provenance of the piece between
1939 and 1954 is quite "murky).
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"owner" and the "purchaser/transferor" have since died. The defen-
dant is a public art museum that has publicly exhibited the piece for
six years and the previous possessor had displayed the piece in two
very large museums. What is a museum director to do? 59 The result
of the case may write the script for similar suits across the country,
thereby increasing the risks (and costs) of frivolous and nuisance law-
suits. Cases like the Seattle Matisse tend to arise in remarkably simi-
lar scenarios, and as a result, call for both treatment as a stolen-art
claim and, for reasons of the passage of a great length of time, a spe-
cific application of the Discovery Rule.160 This rule should, however,
for reasons that will be outlined below, be applied statutorily.161
A. Nazis as "Thieves" and Why the Two Innocents of Holocaust
Victim Art Litigation are Better Served by Legislative, Rather than
Judicial, Rule Making
This Note must, as a preliminary matter, establish two things.
First, for the purposes of this Note, the art looting which took place-
by all parties to the Second World War to varying degrees 6 -- must
be seen as much more than mere thievery. The Nazi looting of art
from Jewish and other disfavored citizens of Germany and the nations
annexed or conquered by Germany was, unlike robbery, an organized
state action. The "official" nature of the looting had two effects.
First, it gave the activity an air of legitimacy that is not present in
theft. Second, it lessened the likelihood of any, let alone successful,
resistance to the wrongful taking. However, useful comparisons to
more "traditional" art theft can, and must, be made, for the same goals
that courts dealing with other title claims are seeking to maximize
must also be maximized here. The same rules of art theft adjudication
19 Some parties, including the claimants of the Chicago Degas, have opted to settle and
give the disputed piece to a public museum, thereby permitting both the owner and good faith
purchaser to take a huge tax deduction pursuant to LR.C. §170(a)(1). For a discussion of the
Degas settlement, see Rosenbaum, supra text accompanying note 62, but note that the negotia-
tions have broken down over the issue of fair valuation. Such win-win arrangements, however,
may not be possible if one of the parties is a museum and the other party an heir who is unlikely
to be able to make full use of the tax deduction. See generally Ehl, supra note 3 (outlining the
problems that this sort of tax deduction settlement agreement may cause).
t6 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp.2d 1029 (W.D. Wash. 1999)
(deciding action against museum brought by daughter and daughter-in-law of art dealer who had
owned Matisse painting that was looted during the Second World War); Summary of Seattle Art
Museum's Position Related to the Controversy over Matisse's Odalisque, (Sept. 1, 1998) (not-
ing the Catch-22 in which the SAM. now finds itself) (on file with author and available upon
request from Linda Williams, S.A.M. Public Relations, LindaW@SeattleArtMuseum.org).
161 While it is true that the Discovery Rule has traditionally been applied on a case-by-case
basis, see supra Part Ill.B, the issue of Holocaust-survivor fine art claims are of a nature that is
better addressed by the sort of policy weighing, unaffected by the drama of the courtroom, in
which legislatures are designed to engage.162 See supra Part ILA.
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can be utilized effectively in this context to achieve substantial justice
for the contestants. While there is no question that the Nazis and their
collaborators did engage in inhumane behavior and some appropri-
ately were punished at Nuremberg, there is equally no reason to think
that innocent, good faith purchasers, nearly sixty years later, are
proper parties to now punish. As a result, the law should, and has in
the past, made useful comparisons between World War II art looting
and more "traditional" robbery and theft,163 and should thereby be
open to an application of one of the doctrines of adverse possession.
Second, any rule-making should begin in the legislature, where a
delicate balance between the competing interests of both the bona fide
purchasers, who are for the first time learning that the title of their
purchase is unclear, and the unfortunate victims of World War II over
sixty years ago, can be achieved. Some commentators have argued
that the political process can be over-represented by concentrated in-
terests and, as a result, "malfunction."1s In the present controversy,
however, both parties (Holocaust victims and art owners), while rela-
tively "concentrated," are extremely savvy, well organized, and well
represented in the political process. In fact, it is likely that the equal-
ity of access to the political process will result in either cancellation
or a balanced appreciation of both positions. Furthermore, while it is
unquestionable that traditional stolen art cases are so unique as to of-
ten require individual judicial determination, here, all of the dispos-
sessions occurred under one "event" over a singular ten-year period.
The situation here, because of the high emotion wrapped up in
the controversy, demands a rule-making procedure that is, in many
ways, ignorant of the facts of any specific case. The federal judiciary
and the Supreme Court of the United States have, on numerous occa-
sions, voiced their recognition of the functional limitations of the ju-
diciary. 165 The courts often justify the existence of per se rules-of
163 See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (comparing
looting of painting by Nazis to more traditional "war booty"), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608
(N.Y.App. Div. 1967) (modifying amount awarded to plaintiffs), rev'd on other grounds, 246
N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
164 See NEIL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECr ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PuBic PoLicY 26-27 (1994).
165 See, e.g., U.S. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass. 1953)
(antitrust case) ("Judges in prescribing remedies have known their own limitations. They do not
ex officio have economic or political training. Their prophecies as to the economic future are
not guided by unusually subtle judgment. They are not so representative as other branches of
the government .... Hearings in court do not usually give the remote judge as sound a feeling
for the realities of a situation as other procedures do."), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
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which statutes of limitations are a type-on the rationale of judicial
economy.
166
B. Applying the Discovery Rule to Art Claims Arising From the
Second World War
A rule that would require either a strict statute of limitations or
no statute of limitations at all is inappropriate in the present contro-
versy. A strict statute of limitations ignores the mobility and ease of
concealment of stolen art, while no statute of limitations allows a
would-be plaintiff to sit on her rights, thereby causing prejudice to a
defendant. 67 A middle ground must be reached.168 Courts who are
or will be faced with the issue of World War II art claims have and
should continue to apply the balancing tests of the Discovery and Due
Diligence Rules. The Discovery Rule balances the plaintiff's right to
have her remedy preserved and the defendant's right to repose and
quiet title. Only through such equitable balancing will the special
characteristics of the object and the interests of all the parties be taken
into account. This is especially true when the defendant is a public
museum and has publicly displayed the piece in question for years
(and to a lesser degree to private collectors who frequently loan their
pieces for exhibition). To be sure, when appropriate, the parties
should make every effort to settle in a mutually beneficial way, but
there are times when settlement is inappropriate.
69
The Discovery Rule can and should be statutorily applied in such
a way as to encourage parties to act consistently with the rationale of
the rule (i.e. plaintiffs must search and defendants must purchase in
good faith and make their possession known). Also, unless every
holder of this now dubious"art is willing to initiate a quiet title action,
some state action will be necessary in order to create "marketable"
title. State statutory recognition of a possessor's title, provided cer-
tain indicia of due diligence have been met, serves to quiet title across
the jurisdiction. As such, a model Discovery Rule-type statute of
limitations for title claims resulting specifically from the Second
World War might look like the following:
166 See, e.g., U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (holding that despite
the reasonableness of the "fixed" price, the conspiracy was per se illegal because an individual
determination of the reasonableness of the price would be too judicially costly).
167 A putative plaintiff might, for example, wait to file until he or she was in more favor-
able tax situation before filing an action for the return of very valuable property.
168 See Petrovich, supra note 133, at 1149 (noting that the Discovery Rule doctrine is a
flexible alternative to strict statutes of limitations).
169 See supra note 159.
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ALL CLAIMS FOR THE RETURN OF ART WRONGFULLY
DISPLACED AS A RESULT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
AND THE THREE YEARS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
(1938-1948) SHALL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF
THE ENACTMENT OF THIS STATUTE IF THE ALLEGED
POSSESSOR MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS LAID OUT IN (1)
AND (2) BELOW. 170
(1) THE TRANSACTION BY WHICH THE POSSESSOR
ACQUIRED THE ITEM IN ISSUE WAS DONE IN GOOD
FAITH EVIDENCED BY THE POSSESSOR BY EN-
GAGING IN AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOLLOWING AT
THE TIME OFACQUISITION:
(a) CHECKING WITH A STOLEN ARTWORK REG-
ISTRY, 171 IF IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF
ACQUISITION;
(b) CHECKING WITH A RELEVANT LAW EN-
FORCEMENTAGENCY;17 1 OR
(c) INVESTIGATING TITLE WITHIN THE ART IN-
DUSTRY ITSELF.
THE INCURRING OF INVESTIGATION COSTS IN EXCESS
OF THE VALUE OF THE PIECE AT THE TIME OF AC-
QUISITION IS NOT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO DEFEND A
CLAIM.
(2) WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE ENACTMENT OF THIS
STATUTE, THE POSSESSOR HAS:
(a) DISPLAYED THE PIECE PUBLICLY IN A MUSEUM
WITH ATTENDANCE IN AXCESS OF 20,000
170 Clearly, it would be improper to permit the statute of limitations to run against an indi-
vidual or government who was barred from having their claim heard in a U.S. court. See, e.g.,
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1164 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the
statute of limitations did not run against East Germany until it was officially recognized by the
United States and thereby permitted to be heard in U.S. courts). This type of tolling would also
be properly applied to individuals who were, because of an oppressive regime, not permitted to
have access to a Western tribunal.
' "Stolen Artwork Registry" refers generally to standardized lists of lost or stolen objects
such as the Art Loss Registry (ALR) maintained by Christie's and Sotheby's auction houses,
and other such registries which may come into existence and such standardization (e.g. the so-
called "Jewish Masterlist"). See Bibas, supra note 101, at 2462 ("[A] theft registry requires only
that theft victims report art thefts. The advent of computer networks and high-quality digitized
color images has made possible the recent creation of an international theft registry .... The
database stores descriptions and photographs of thousands of stolen items in a central computer.
For a small fee, buyers can search the registry.") (citations omitted).
172 "Relevant Law Enforcement Agency" refers to the law enforcement agency responsible
for the jurisdiction wherein the work is traded, and has been traded (e.g. if the piece has been
traded abroad, but purchased domestically, inquiry to the FBI and an international agency such
as Interpol may be necessary).
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PEOPLE PER YEAR FOR A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF
180 DAYS PER YEAR;
173
(b) PUBLISHED THE WORK, AND THE POSSESSION
THEREOF, IN A PIECE OF ACADEMIC OR ART
INDUSTRY LITERATURE WITH A REASONABLY
WIDE CIRCULATION; 174 OR
(c) LISTED THE PIECE, AND THE POSSESSION
THEREOF, ON AN ART REGISTRY, IF IN EX-
ISTENCE.
IF SUCH CLAIMS ARE NOT MADE WITHIN THE ABOVE
PERIOD THEY ARE HEREBY BARRED AND BOTH LEGAL
AND MARKETABLE TITLE ARE VESTED IN THE PRESENT
POSSESSOR.
The five-year statute of limitations serves to quiet title in muse-
ums and private collectors that display work publicly, provided that
they purchased the work in good faith. Such a limitations period
tends to favor those who were actually victims of the War, rather than
their heirs several years later. Section (1) of the proposed statute sets
out several objective standards for a determination of a "good faith
purchase." It requires that the purchaser inquire into the title of the
piece to a reasonable extent (e.g. it would be unreasonable to require
inquiry into a work's history that would be more costly than the piece
itself). It does not permit the type of "willful blindness" that has
tended to be the norm in the fine art trade, but does so in a way that
recognizes that these pieces were often acquired in an age when much
less investigation was feasible. 75 Furthermore, as these types of rec-
ords become more accessible, these costs will decrease and more in-
quiry will be statutorily required. If a piece was not purchased in
good faith, the original owner, whether victim or heir, will not be
protected by the statute. Section (2) lays out objective tests for what
is required to meet the "open and notorious" requirements of the Dis-
covery Rule. It requires that the possessor act "reasonably" to put the
173 A sort of "tacking" of exhibitions would be appropriate if the exhibition was traveling.
174 "Reasonably Wide Circulation" means that the publication in which the work appears
has at least 20,000 copies and an international distribution.
175 Cf. Bibas, supra note 101, at Part Ill (taking an owner-oriented approach rather than the
buyer-oriented approach taken in this Note). The author argues that:
To reduce litigation costs, courts should eschew Guggenheim's vague balancing and
should announce what steps by an owner automatically defeat a laches defense. If
an owner took no significant steps to report a theft (such as notifying the police or a
catalogue raisonne) and this silence prejudiced the buyer, laches should bar recov-
ery. Where a buyer has taken pains to investigate and found nothing because of an
owner's laziness, the owner should pay for her sloth.
Id. at 2467-68.
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would-be claimant on notice. Again, if the piece is squirreled away
following even a good faith purchase, the statute will act as no pro-
tection. Such a rule recognizes that altruism is often not enough to
keep pieces in public consumption. This rule, therefore, counteracts a
collector's impulse to remove a work from exhibition when a piece's
history is cloudy.
176
Even if courts are left to adjudicate the issue on an ad hoc basis,
the Discovery Rule, as described above, is appropriate. In addition to
this equitable principle, courts must also aggressively use the tool of
summary judgment so as to weed out weak and groundless claims,
realizing that many of these defendants are public facilities of limited
means. When the Discovery Rule is properly applied, it will cut in
favor of museums and private collectors who exhibit their work pub-
licly while at the same time permitting original owners, provided that
they have acted with "due diligence," to have their day in court. If
enacted, the statute will quiet title to those parties who have behaved
"honestly" and perhaps finally start to heal one of the still-open
wounds of the Second World War.
C. Meeting Expectations, Quieting Title, and Limiting Nuisance
Suits: Economic Justifications for the Discovery Rule
Uncertainty is expensive, and this is especially true in the area of
art ownership, where it is often an unbargained-for expense. In situa-
tions such as the ownership of extremely valuable art treasures, par-
ties must have clear behavioral standards in order to both predict the
result of past actions and to plan for the future. Uncertainty and the
doctrine of repose is essentially the rationale for applying a statute of
limitations to claims for personal property, something that states are
far from reluctant to do.177 As more and more of these cases come to
public attention, the cost of art ownership is likely to have a huge in-
crease. While normally the externalities of ownership should be in-
ternalized into the true cost of ownership, in the present case, these
costs are being asserted 30 or 40 years after the purchase and are, as a
176 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 72, at 11 (discussing two collectors who removed art
pieces at an exhibition because of recent disputes of ownership).
177 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West 1998) (providing for a three-year
statute of limitations for the recovery of chattels, but in the case of the theft of any article of
"historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance [the statutory period] is not deemed to
have accrued until the discovery of the whereabouts of the article by the aggrieved party"); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-205 (West 1998) (providing for a five-year statute of limitations
for the recovery of possession of personal property); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 1998)
(providing for a three-year statute of limitations for "an action to recover a chattel"); OHIo RFV.
CODE ANN. § 2305.09 (Anderson 1998) (providing for a four-year statute of limitations "[flor
the recovery of personal property, or for taking or detaining it").
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result, totally unbargained-for and often borne by those that can least
afford it.
The publicity of high profile cases, such as the Seattle case, will
encourage plaintiffs with tangential and weak cases to sue museums,
realizing that public sentiment is likely to push the museum toward
settlement. Some outside limit must be made, and it must be one that
takes cognizance of the situation and the interests of both parties.
Even commentators who argue in favor of recognizing the rights of
original owner over those of subsequent good faith purchasers recog-
nize the benefits of some statute of limitations:
Since long delays in suing increase the risk of legal error by
making it difficult to unmask spurious claims, there is an ar-
gument for having some fixed deadline for suit. At some
point, the incremental effect of a very long statute of limita-
tions in discouraging theft by reducing the price of stolen art
will be offset by the effect on legal error costs. Moreover,
these error costs are borne ex ante by original owners as well
as by bona fide purchasers, since most original owners were
once bona fide purchasers and they don't want to be harassed
by persons claiming to be previous owners. Hence, even
original owners would favor the law's imposing some period
of limitations on suits for the recovery of stolen or lost art.78
Most importantly, however, if would-be defendants meet the sug-
gested indicia of compliance, the social value of art (i.e. public edifi-
cation) is necessarily maximized while at the same time removing any
excuse for not discovering the piece. If that is true, the harm incurred
by the victim, fifty-four years prior, will be outweighed by the social
good sought to be maximized. However, if the social good is not
maximized (e.g. none or few of the statute's requirements are met) the
victim's harm clearly outweighs the social utility. As a result, the bad
faith purchaser or hoarder may still possess dubious art, but in doing
so must internalize the cost of a potential title claim. The piece will
therefore accurately reflect its true cost and any later claim will be a
bargained-for risk. By only protecting those who comply with the
exhibition requirements of the statute, the rule maximizes the goals of
178 Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 203 (emphasis and citations omitted). In addition,
the judicial application of the Discovery Rule in various tort actions was often explicitly prem-
ised on a finding that its application would not unduly prejudice the defendant. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Waric, 445 N.E.2d 1272, 1275 011. App. Ct. 1983) (finding that the illinois Su-
preme Court had ruled that a case may not proceed if the "hardship to plaintiff was outweighed
by the increase in the difficulties of proof'); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 174
(N.H. 1977) (opting not to proceed with an application of the Discovery Rule until the court was
satisfied that "the defendant's interests have not changed or been prejudiced in any way by the
delay in this case").
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all art law (i.e. recognizing and protecting the title of good faith pur-
chasers while recognizing the need for repose). 179
D. The Discovery Rule Encourages Both "Searching" and
"Exhibiting"
In order for an owner to have her work returned, the Discovery
Rule requires that she use reasonable efforts to locate the piece in or-
der to toll the statute of limitations. 80 The effect of this requirement
is obvious: the owner, if the value of the piece exceeds the cost of
finding it, will search for the piece. The Discovery Rule also has the
interesting effect of requiring that the possession be "notorious" (i.e.
the possession should give the diligent searcher some idea of its loca-
tion and the identity of the possessor). This rule regime encourages
good faith purchasers to publicly display their pieces, while it is likely
that a rule of no repose would drive pieces "underground" in order to
avoid unprotected detection. Purchasers will have a real incentive,
other than the ones inherent in art ownership,18' to display the piece
publicly. O'Keeffe herself argued that public display should be suffi-
cient to start the Statute of Limitations running. 182 Museums, which
by definition display the pieces in their possession and publish lists of
179 See KOMESAR, supra note 164, at 24 (discussing the remedy awarded in Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), and arguing that the rule forced the defen-
dant to internalize the costs of its production and gave the correct incentives to "search for
modes of avoidance").
18o See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980) (remanding the case to the trial
court and stating that:
[i]n determining whether O'Keeffe is entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule, the trial
court should consider, among others, the following issues: (1) whether O'Keeffe used due
diligence to recover the paintings at the time of the alleged theft and thereafter; (2)
whether at the time of the alleged theft there was an effective method, other than talking
to her colleagues, for O'Keeffe to alert the art world; and (3) whether registering paint-
ings with the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. or any other organization would
put a reasonably prudent purchaser of art on constructive notice that someone other than
the possessor was the true owner.
Id.
181 See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 181 (citations omitted). Landes and Posner
assert that:
[Art is] a prestige good that enables the collector to signal to others that he is a per-
son of both wealth and good taste. The collector gets utility not only from admiring
the work hanging in his living room but also from believing that other people envy
or admire him because he owns it. To obtain this additional utility, people who buy
art don't want to keep it hidden away. They brag about owning it, show it to friends,
lend it to museums and galleries for exhibitions .... [Miost collectors go out of
their way to get their paintings included in shows and books. They do this partly to
confirm and enhance the value of the works but also to obtain utility from having
one's name ("lent by" or "in the collection of") publicly associated with the work
.... Art's signaling value makes it more likely that the rightful owner will eventu-
ally find his long-lost work.
Id.
"2 See O'Keeffe, 416 A.2dat871.
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their collections, will be encouraged to continue to display them be-
cause the more they do, the less likely an owner can argue that she
reasonably searched yet did not find. The benefit enjoyed by public
museums and exhibiting collectors will also accrue to the public as
more pieces, especially never before seen works, are publicly exhib-
ited.183
This rule regime also has the effect of recognizing title in an
original owner who has, for reasons outside her control, been unable
to locate a lost work. The uncontrollable excuses are, for most
would-be plaintiffs, the information freeze of the Communist regimes
of Eastern Europe and the apathetic attitude of much of the West.
These protections only exist, however, if the claimant searches, and,
with the continued thaw of the Cold War, technological revolution,
and increased public and political interest, the cost and difficulty of
that search grows less prohibitive on a daily basis) 84
E. Limitations ofAction for Breach of Warranty of Title
Another reason for adopting an owner-friendly rule is that often
the purchaser cannot seek compensation from the seller of the stolen
piece. 185 Often the cause of action for breach of the warranty of title
is barred by a statute of limitations that begins to run as soon as the
item is sold. Additionally, the situation of warranty of title is ob-
scured by the vague differences in warranty that result from whether
the painting was purchased from the artist,186 a gallery, 187 or an auc-
tionl ss  These differences are made all the more difficult to deal
with by the peculiarities of property law that are unique to any given
country or state. Some of these particularities can be seen simply by
comparing the legal systems of the Continent, where much of this art
was purchased, and the common-law systems of the United Kingdom
and its former empire, where much of this art is now held.'89 Fur-
113 See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 183-84 (noting that "[tihe more secure that prop-
erty rights in works of art [sic], the more likely those works are to circulate, conferring value on
art lovers, scholars, and artists.").
1&4 See supra Part II.D.
"5 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-725 (1990) (providing for a four-year limitations period for an
action for breach of the warranty of title).
16 The artist, as creator, has clear title to the object as compared to situations such as "en-
trustment," whereby the owner intends to pass possession but not title. See Patty Gerstenblith,
Picture hperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art Market, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 501, 546-
51(1988).
187 Sale at a gallery has traditionally been seen as a statement that the piece's title is free
and clear and held without reservation by the gallery. See id. at 554.
J3 An auction house only purports to sell as much title as the true seller actually has. See
id. at 553-55.
Ib9 As one commentator explains:
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thermore, the art buyer/seller arrangement is often one of unbalanced
expertise that puts the buyer at the mercy of the legal maneuverings
of the seller. The merchant (who may escape liability simply by the
passage of time) is often in a far better position to determine the
provenance of the item190 or perhaps even seek title insurance. 191 As
a result, unless the law is willing to protect the good faith purchaser
with the use of a balancing test such as the Discovery Rule, any other
protection for the purchaser may be, in practice, illusory. To counter-
act this, parties will have to resort to the law of contract to resolve
these questions-a practice disfavored by the U.C.C. 9 2-- and the re-
sult is likely to be increased transaction costs. 193  While it may be
proper to assume that good faith purchasers would be able to recap-
ture their loss under "normal" art theft circumstances, clearly many of
the present disputes are "abnormal" simply by the passage of a great
length of time.
F. No Protection for Bad Faith Purchasers
Contrary to criticism, 194 an application of the Discovery Rule, as
outlined above, will not open the floodgates to the future laundering
of stolen art. To begin with, this application is meant to apply only to
claims resulting from the Second World War. Other broader schemes
have been discussed adequately elsewhere. 195 Furthermore, the pro-
tection that the proposed Discovery Rule model statute brings to good
faith purchasers is likely to be severely limited in the near future, and
with good reason. As the number of stolen art registries increases,
and title searches get less costly, purchasers of formerly stolen prop-
The civil law permits a thief to transfer title to a good faith purchaser of goods, al-
though the passage of time is also a relevant factor in the requirements for acquisi-
tion of title. In the United States, on the other hand, according to both the common
law of sales and the Uniform Commercial
Code, a transferor can only convey as good a title as he or she has .... [E]ven after
several transfers through good faith purchasers, good title can still not be attained.
Gerstenblith, supra note 96, at 19-20 (citations omitted).
190 See Gerstenblith, supra note 186, at 562 (discussing the merchant's superior position
for authenticating the art).
191 See Bibas, supra note 101, at 2467 (discussing some of the loss spreading mechanisms
held by art merchants).
'92 See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1) (1990) ("By the original agreement the parties may reduce the
period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.") (emphasis added).
193 See generally Gerstenblith, supra note 186, at 556-61 (arguing for theories of both tort
and agency liability in the buyer/seller relationship).
194 See generally Bibas, supra note 101, at 2437 (arguing that statutes of limitations actu-
ally encourage art theft).
195 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 101, at 2437 (arguing that protecting owners by abolishing
limitations periods for many types of personal property "would be both economically and mor-
ally just"); Gerstenblith, supra note 186, at 505-32 (discussing how art practices result in liabil-
ity to both the purchaser and owner of art works); McCord, supra note 19, at 997-1008 (pro-
posing a stricter standard for museums and auction houses in order to help end illegal art trade).
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erty will not be able to effectively argue that their purchases were, in
fact, made in good faith.19 6 This rule, because of its bias in favor of
purchasers, will not lead to a huge increase in stolen art because tech-
nology will cause a successful defense of "good faith" harder to
make. 1
97
However, the lowering of search costs also cuts the other way in
that, as technology spreads information to searching owners, the ex-
cuses for not finding a work that is notoriously displayed grow less
persuasive. While this prediction may ring true for purchases of sto-
len art in the near future, the fact of the matter is that most of these
works were acquired during an period when inquiry, even at its most
diligent, was much more limited. Any present judicial or legislative
solution must take cognizance of this fact and the Discovery Rule,
when applied as suggested above, best settles the title of art displaced
by the confusion of the Second World War when it was acquired in
good faith.
G. Inadequacy of the Demand-and-Refusal Rule
While the Demand-and-Refusal Rule and the Discovery Rule are
in many ways similar, only a balancing test such as the Discovery
Rule adequately takes into account the special problems associated
with claims that are in excess of fifty years old. 198 "The pure de-
mand-and-refusal requirement eviscerates limitation periods by al-
lowing owners to postpone making a demand indefinitely .... And
far from serving its original goal of protecting a BFP from lawsuits, it
makes him perpetually vulnerable to suit."199 The Discovery/Due
Diligence Rule, unlike the Demand-and-Refusal Rule, necessarily
takes time into consideration. Both rules:
serve to delay the accrual of the original owner's cause of
action until the owner discovers the identity of the possessor
of the stolen goods. Nevertheless, two critical differences
distinguish these rules. First, the discovery rule requires an
original owner to continually exercise due diligence in
searching for a missing item. Second, the discovery rule
196 See supra Part IV.B (specifically Section (1) of the model statute and its accompanying
discussion).
197 See Bibas, supra note 101, at 2461 (discussing how an increase in both data bases and
theft registries would make buyers of art more diligent when investigating the art work's his-
tory).
19' Theoretically, under the Demand-and-Refusal Rule, a claim by a would-be plaintiff is
just as fresh 50 years later as it would be the day it was stolen.
19' Bibas, supra note 101, at 2445-46.
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does not require a demand to start the running of the statute
of limitations.2 o
This Note, however, endeavors to explain that because of the great
length of time and common vagaries of each claim, such a rule is nec-
essary to balance the interests of the owner, °1 the good faith pur-
chaser, and the public.20 2  If the Demand-and-Refusal Rule was to be
adopted, title would never be quieted and the problems, inefficiencies,
and injustices outlined above would continue indefinitely.
m11. CONCLUSION
While the common law rule for the good faith purchase of per-
sonal property clearly holds that a thief cannot convey good title,
courts have for years imposed any one of several doctrines as to the
tolling of the statute of limitations period. Today, because of recent
political and technological events, former owners of some culturally
significant and extremely valuable fine arts are coming forward to
make claims to subsequent good faith purchasers their work's return.
Because of the great length of time and huge potential for inequitable
treatment of these possessors, states should codify the Discovery Rule
in a way similar to the proposal outlined in this Note. The rule serves
to encourage public display of the works while giving victims ade-
quate notice of their potential claims. If not adopted, courts that hear
these cases must adopt the Discovery Rule as applied in O'Keeffe v.
Snyder and the subsequent cases outlined above. If courts and legis-
latures in the United States and abroad adopt instead a rule of no re-
pose, these pieces of significant historical, cultural, fiscal and aes-
thetic value will be lost a second time.
STEPHAN J. SCHLEGELMILCH*
20 Ehl, supra note 3, at 672.
201 However, the proposed rule would tend to limit the claims of heirs, rather than survi-
vors themselves, in that these claims would have to be filed within the proposed five-year pe-
riod.
202 See supra Part 1V.C. Many commentators and courts forget that art, unlike many other
items of personal property, has a very real public value that must be weighed in whatever bal-
ancing test applied. See generally Jason R. Goldstein, Note, Deaccession: Not Such a Dirty
Word, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213 (1997); Landes & Posner, supra note 9 (discussing
the unique characteristics of art including the reasons that people choose to acquire it).
This Note is dedicated to my wife, April Schlegelmilch, without whom I would be lost.
Thanks also to Professor Andrew Morriss who patiently taught me the fine art of legal scholar-
ship; any errors in style or content remain mine alone. Finally, thanks to the Allen Memorial
Art Museum, Seattle Art Museum, National Gallery of Art, Minneapolis Institute of Arts, and
the Metropolitan Museum of Art for their help in writing this piece.
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APPENDIX A
Male Nude with a Lion (verso)
Diirer, Albrecht (10 9/16 x 5 9/16), c. 1500
National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
Woodner Family Collection (1991.182.11.16D)
used with permission
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APPENDIX C
Smoke Over the Roofs (Les Fumes Sur Les Toits)
Lger, Fernand
The Minneapolis Institute of Arts
Bequest of Putnam Dana McMillan (61.36.12)
used with permission
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APPENDIX D
Odalisque
Matisse, Henri, 1928
Seattle Art Museum
(photo by Paul Macapia)
used with permission
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